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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : Case No. 860044 
EDDIE MICHAEL UNDERWOOD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Eddie Michael Underwood, was charged with 
Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of Second Degree Murder, in a 
jury trial held December 11, 12, 16, 17, and 18, 1985, in the 
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding. Defendant 
was sentenced by Judge Hyde on December 20, 1985 to five years to 
life in the Utah State Penitentiary. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 7, 1985 at about 4:00 p.m. the 16 year old 
victim Leon Zerfas, left home on his way to work (T. 311-312). 
At about the same time the defendant Eddie Underwood, his mother 
Cleo Underwood, and his sister Dolly Underwood, left Liberty Park 
in Ogden to return to their home at 2268 Jefferson Street. By 
chance defendant and Leon met as defendant was leaving the park. 
Defendant saw Leon across the street talking with a girl (T. 
1024). Leon observed the defendant at about the same time and 
began shouting at defendant (T. 617, 700). Leon crossed the 
street and approached defendant (T. 620, 703, 1026) shouting 
obscenities and challenging defendant to a fist fight (T. 1027). 
Defendant and Leon knew each other because Defendant 
had been involved in an intimate relationship with Leon's mother 
(T. 843-844) which came to an end in July, 1985 when defendant 
was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of Leon's six-year-old 
sister (T. 1014-1015). While charges were pending, defendant had 
Deen ordered to stay away from the family (T. 725, 855, 867, 
1040) . 
At trial, defendant testified that when he saw Leon on 
that street corner he wanted to get away because he had heard 
that Leon was out to get him (T. 1021-1022) and he was afraid. 
However, further testimony by defendant contradicts this. Leon 
had made no attempt to harm defendant in the seven weeks since 
the molestation charges were brought (T. 1040). Also, defendant 
had continued to visit a girlfriend that lived next door to Leon 
and his family (T. 1046). 
As Leon approached defendant on the afternoon of 
September 7, the loud voices attracted the attention of three 
people in a car parked at the curb in front of 2234 Jefferson 
Street (T. 148). The weather on that day was mild and the 
windows of the car were rolled down allowing the witnesses to 
hear the argument between Leon and the defendant (T. 153). The 
two were on the sidewalk north of the car, approximately 2220 
Jefferson Street (T. 150, 427, 515). Defendant's mother and 
sister were several steps behind (T. 151). 
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Upon becoming aware of defendant and the victim, the 
witnesses observed that defendant had a knife in his hand (T. 
151, 428-429, 516) and that Leon was not carrying anything (T. 
153, 521-522)• Leon and defendant continued arguing as they 
moved down the sidewalk but according to the State's witnesses 
Leon made no attempt to physically attack defendant (T. 154, 429, 
520) although defendant testified that Leon was "punching, 
prodding " (T. 1051-1052) as they moved down the stret. 
As defendant and Leon drew closer to the parked car the 
witnesses heard Leon say "Asshole, letfs fight" and "you molested 
my sister" (T. 160, 427, 617, 1027). When Leon noticed that 
defendant had pulled out the knife, he said "Why don't you put 
the knife down and fight me like a man" (T. 159, 433, 521). One 
witness heard Leon make this request three times (T. 159). 
Defendant admitted at trial that Leon requested him to put down 
the knife at least three times (T 1090). Defendant did not 
respond to Leon's requests. 
As Leon and the defendant reached a point just in front 
of the car where the witnesses were seated, Leon saw a pipe lying 
near the curb. Leon crossed in front of defendant and walked 
over to pick up the pipe (T. 1653, 522). Defendant made no 
attempt to stop Leon but defendant testified that he reacted to 
Leon's movement in front of him by raising the knife from the 
position at his side (T. 1030). 
Defendant continued a short distance further down the 
sidewalk then stopped and turned to face Leon (T. 167, 435, 523); 
defendant made no attempt to leave the scene nor did he tell Leon 
to put down the pipe and go home. 
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Leon returned to the sidewalk holding the pipe in front 
of himself in a defensive manner, making no attempt to swing at 
defendant (T. 175, 227, 437, 530). As Leon took a step forward, 
defendant moved toward Leon, grabbed the pipe, pulled Leon 
forward and stabbed him (T. 174, 228, 437-38, 529). At trial, 
defendant claimed that Leon was swinging and flailing the pipe so 
that defendant had no alternative to the action he took — 
"That's it, it's him or me." (T. 1033). 
After the stabbing, defendant turned to the bystanders 
and stated that they were all witnesses to self-defense (T. 176, 
237, 1076), then wiped off the knife (T. 181, 235, 271, 442, 655-
656, 1070) and told his mother to hide it (T. 715, 1071). 
Death was almost immediate for Leon Zerfas. Dr. Edwin 
S. Sweeney, State Medical Examiner, testified that Leon died from 
a stab wound to the chest (T. 278) which punctured the heart, 
causing fatal internal hemorrhage (T. 279). Dr. Sweeney stated 
that the wound was "very serious and likely to be fatal no matter 
what" (T. 279-280). Leon died within a minute or so after he was 
stabbed (T. 279). 
When questioned by police at the scene, defendant 
denied that he had been injured (T. 365). When later booked into 
jail defendant was asked specifically if he had been hit and 
replied: not that he knew of (T. 569). Detective Shane Minor 
then pointed out a small abrasion on defendant's upper arm. 
Detective Minor testified that defendant laughed and said, 
•That's going to be better for me, that's real good" (T. 569). 
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On December 18, 1985 the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty of second degree murder. Defendant now appeals that 
conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented below, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, supports defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder. Witnesses contradicted 
defendant's claim of self defense with evidence that the victim's 
threats were verbal and that defendant escalated the altercation 
by brandishing a knife. The jury was free to conclude that the 
victim was merely protecting himself when he picked up a pipe 
lying nearby and held it in front of his body without swinging it 
at defendant. There was no gap in the State's evidence nor was 
the jury obligated to accept defendant's account of the fight. 
Thus, reasonable minds could have concluded, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant was guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented against 
him at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 
Specifically, defendant asserts that the State failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life. 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction this Court has applied a strict 
standard of review: 
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This Court will not lightly overturn a jury 
verdict. When there is any evidence, 
including reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can be 
reasonably made, our inquiry stops and we 
sustain the verdict. 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). Although 
defendant's testimony contradicted the State's evidence, that in 
itself is not grounds for reversal. State v. Buehl> 700 P.2d 701 
(Utah 1985). 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not 
within the prerogative of this Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
factfinder. 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
At trial, and on appeal, defendant argues that he acted 
in self defense, that the evidence as presented at trial was 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind that 
defendant acted with the depraved indifference necessary to 
convict him of second degree murder. According to Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-203(1) (c) one may be convicted of second degree murder 
when "acting under circum-stances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of 
another." 
This Court, in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984), set forth four elements the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a jury may properly convict one of second 
degree murder under the depraved indifference standard. They 
are: 
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1. The defendant engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death to another; and 
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant 
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another; and 
3. The circumstances under which the 
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a , 
reasonable roan rather than subjectively by 
the actual state of defendants mind, were 
such as to evidence a depraved indifference 
to human life; and 
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully caused 
the death of another. 
Id. at 1047. Defendant admitted that he engaged in conduct that 
not only created a grave risk of death to another but did cause 
death to occur. However, defendant argues that his conduct was 
reasonable as an act of self-defense. According to Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-2-402 (1953) a person is justified in using force which 
is "intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." 
Section 76-2-402 further states: 
A person will not be justified in using force 
when he: 
a) Initially provokes the use of force 
against himself with the intent to use force 
as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the 
assailant; or 
c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a 
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from 
the encounter and effectively communicates to 
such other person his intent to do so and the 
other notwithstanding continues or threatens 
to continue the use of unlawful force. 
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Since the use of force requires a reasonable belief 
that such force is necessary, defendant did not establish that he 
acted in self defense. Defendant testified that he believed his 
life to be in danger, that the victim was "flailing" the pipe 
around trying to hit defendant and that he determined that he 
•could no longer fend him off," finally deciding, "That's it; now 
it's him or me" (T. 1033). This testimony is contrary to the 
testimony of at least four witnesses who indicated that 
defendant's fear of the victim was not a reasonable belief. 
According to these witnesses the victim never swung the pipe at 
defendant (T. 175, 227, 437, 530). Although the victim verbally 
abused defendant and challenged him to a fist fight prior to 
picking up the pipe, there is testimony indicating that the 
victim never hit the defendant, or in any way attempted to 
physically hurt him. There is substantial testimony to indicate 
that Leon picked up the pipe in order to protect himself, not to 
use it as a weapon. 
Even though defendant argues that he reasonably 
believed his life to be in danger, defendant's use of deadly 
force would be prohibited by the exceptions listed in § 76-2-
402(2). First, one who provokes the use of force against himself 
may not later claim self-defense. Although there is 
contradictory testimony concerning whether or not force was used 
against defendant, such force (if used) was provoked by defendant 
when he pulled out the knife. Up to that point, Leon's attack 
was strictly verbal, there was no threat of imminent deadly force 
(which defendant admitted at trial (T. 1053)). Yet, defendant 
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claims that the verbal assault of a 16 year old boy caused 
"substantial fear" and justified the escalation of the 
altercation by pulling the knife. 
Second, an aggressor, or one who engages in combat by 
agreement, may not later claim that his actions were in self-
defense* When defendant pulled out the knife he became the 
aggressor. He moved the turbulence from the level of a 
challenged fist fight to an encounter with a deadly weapon. 
Defendant's actions also indicate a willingness to engage in 
combat. Defendant made no attempt to prevent the clash. He 
never suggested that Leon go home; nor did he verbally refuse the 
challenge to fight. Defendant made no attempt to leave the scene 
but chose to stop and wait when Leon moved off the sidewalk to 
pick up the pipe. Instead of continuing down the block to his 
home at 2268 Jefferson Street, a few houses away, the defendant 
chose to remain on the sidewalk at 2234 Jefferson Street and 
fight. 
Although defendant did not provoke Leonfs verbal 
attack, defendant became the aggressor when he pulled out the 
knife. Further, defendants actions imply an agreement to engage 
in an altercation. Defendant made no attempt to leave the scene, 
or to prevent physical force from being used. Witnesses 
testified that defendant appeared to be the aggressor (T. 272) 
and that there was no need to stab the boy (T. 183-184). 
The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that defendant was not acting in self-defense but was 
acting with the culpable mental state necessary to convict him of 
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second-degree murder• The jury acts as the sole judge of the 
witnesses1 credibility and need not accept defendant's self-
serving explanations. State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985). 
Thus, the jury's verdict should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of the lower 
court. 
DATED this /#^( day of March, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
C^ Assistant Attorney General 
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